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Abstract 
 
It is well-understood that the success of liberalizing the electricity supply 
industry depends crucially on the quality of the underlying regulatory 
institutional framework. This paper analyses the regulatory arrangements that 
underpin the work of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). These 
arrangements are contrasted with the regulatory structure of electricity 
provision in Norway. A key difference between the reform processes in the 
two countries relates to the lack of privatization in Norway and the co-
existence of private and publicly owned generators and distributors in 
Australia. This comparative analysis allows us to make several 
recommendations to improve regulatory arrangements in Australia.  These 
include greater independence for the AER, better coordination among 
regulatory institutions, greater use of benchmarking analysis, greater 
customer involvement, and improving market transparency and privatization 
of government-owned corporations. However, the success of privatization 
will hinge upon the effectiveness of the regulatory environment.    
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1. Introduction and Purpose  
 
What role does economic regulation play in the success of electricity sector 
liberalization? Why the success of liberalization depends on the effectiveness of the 
existing regulatory framework and regulatory institutions? This paper attempts to 
address these questions in the context of the Australian liberalizing electricity 
industry. Our assessment coincides growing concerns with rising electricity prices and 
spiraling network costs largely attributed to economic inefficiencies and underlying 
flaws in the regulatory environment (Productivity Commission, 2013).  
 
Australia’s liberalization of the electricity sector started with the reform of the 
Victorian State Electricity Commission which languished under public dissatisfaction 
as a result of mounting electricity prices, with privatization offering an attractive 
opportunity for Victoria to reduce significant levels of state debt (Quiggin, 2001; 
Sharma, 2003; Moran and Sood, 2013). The Victorian power exchange started 
operating the first Australian power market in Victoria in 1994 while transmission 
was unbundled and a market was launched in New South Wales (NSW) in 1996. 
Queensland (QLD) mimicked the reforms that took place in NSW in 1998 while in 
South Australia (SA), accounting unbundling took place in 1997 following the early 
corporatization efforts of the state-owned vertically integrated utility in 1995. Thus, 
the restructuring of the vertically integrated and state owned Australian electricity 
supply industry (ESI) of the early 1990s involved the separation of competitive 
(generation and retail) and monopoly segments (transmission and distribution 
networks, supply) with increased participation of privately owned firms in the 
competitive segments. The establishment of the National Electricity Market (NEM) in 
1998, which is an energy-only market for wholesale electricity trade, indicated stricter 
adherence to the ‘textbook’ reform model aimed at widening and deepening 
competition in the wholesale market.  
 
Electricity sector liberalization in Australia occurred within the wider context of 
improving the competitiveness of the Australian economy starting with financial 
deregulation over the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, the floating of the exchange rate 
subjected Australian exports, comprised mainly of agricultural and mining goods, to 
global competitive forces, whilst high tariff walls protected manufactured goods from 
competition. The inward focus of domestic industry, led to declining standards of 
living, unemployment, inflation, and balance of payments deficits. This led the 
Hawke-Keating Labour government to setup an independent Committee of Inquiry 
into National Competition Policy for Australia in 1992, also known as the Hilmer 
Report (Hilmer, 1993).  The recommendations from the Hilmer Report, delivered in 
1993, were to focus on efficiency and productivity throughout the economy, by 
improving economic management and removing impediments to competition. 
Included in the rationalization of economic management, was the recommendation 
that the public sector monopoly businesses be restructured and that third party access 
be given to significant infrastructure. 
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After more than two decades of electricity sector reforms, the current state of 
electricity reform progress in Australia is marked by individual heterogeneity across 
different states
1
. The natural monopoly segments remain economically regulated 
where the independent regulator sets network charges. However, network charges 
have experienced sharp increase where network costs constitute around 40-50 percent 
of an average household's electricity bill largely driven by increasing network and 
retail allowances, which have more than doubled since 2007. For example, the 
regulated network companies in New South Wales (NSW) and Queensland (QLD) 
with significant public ownership have experienced increasing transmission and 
distribution network revenue allowances leading to increasing network costs that are 
not necessarily efficient (AER, 2013). Hence, average electricity prices rose by 
around 70 percent in real terms from June 2007 to December 2012 in Australia 
largely blamed to increasing network costs in most states and the flaws in the existing 
network regulatory environment (Productivity Commission, 2013). NSW households 
experienced an 80 percent increase in electricity prices from 2007 to 2012 while end-
user electricity prices have also increased in Victoria where private ownership is 
persistent (Reeves, 2013). These price increases contradicts the proclaimed perception 
on the benefits of electricity sector liberalization that it would lead to lower consumer 
prices (Chester and Morris, 2011).   
 
This paper, therefore, reviews the role and structure of current regulatory framework 
and institutions surrounding the economic regulation of electricity networks in the 
NEM. By ‘economic regulation’ we refer to both direct legislation and administrative 
regulation of prices and entry in line with Joskow and Rose (1989). We also study the 
role, structures and procedures of electricity regulation in Norway. Cross-country case 
studies are also suitable for in-depth investigation and qualitative analysis (Jamasb et 
al. 2004). Norway is an interesting case study as a forerunner of ESI liberalization, 
which has been able to nurture both wholesale and retail competition and incentive-
regulation in the market without privatization (Moen and Hamrin, 1996; Magnus, 
1997; Askim and Claes, 2011). The liberalized Norwegian electricity market has 
performed well in terms of economic efficiency and market functionality (Midttun 
and Thomas, 1998; Bye and Hope, 2005).  
 
This paper also seeks to contribute to the existing limited literature that analyses the 
regulatory issues and options in the NEM. We believe that there are relevant 
conclusions to be drawn and suggestions that can be made for improving the structure 
of the independent regulatory environment in Australia. This is necessary because the 
success of liberalization in network and infrastructure industries is only realized by 
effectively managing the interface between the competitive and regulated segments 
where economic regulation in terms of the regulatory regime, regulatory arrangements 
and its varying supporting institutions plays a pivotal role (Newbery, 2002).  
 
                                                        
1 Please see Moran and Sood (2013) on the evolution of Australia’s National Electricity Market. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
economic reasoning on the importance of suitable regulatory framework and 
regulatory institutions while undertaking regulatory reform in liberalizing electricity 
markets. Section 3 presents the regulatory institutional organization in Australia and 
Norway. We also compare the role, structures and procedures of electricity regulation 
between Australia and Norway. Section 4 identifies regulatory shortcomings in the 
NEM and recommends improving key regulatory issues. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. Background and Scope: Institutions and Economic Regulation 
 
Electricity networks are capital intensive and generally viewed as exhibiting natural 
monopoly characteristics such as large economies of scale, scope and densities (Kahn, 
1971). These characteristics imply that in practice entry to network businesses is 
restricted and price regulation is required to minimize inefficiencies associated with 
monopoly pricing. Regulated prices are typically set by an independent regulator such 
that the regulated firm are allowed to recover the efficient costs of providing the 
service. The price setting process is concerned with two different types of incentives 
(Joskow, 2013).  
 
The first is the incentive for regulated firms to make regulatory submissions that more 
accurately reflect their actual expectation of cost required for providing the regulated 
services over the next control period.  The economic literature refers to the case where 
the firm has an incentive to overstate its cost forecasts as adverse selection (or hidden 
information).  The second is the incentive for firms to reduce costs during the 
regulatory period below those initially approved by the regulator. The economic 
literature refers to the case where firms have no incentives to reduce costs as moral 
hazard (or hidden action).   
 
The emergence of adverse selection and moral hazard is related to a fundamental 
asymmetry of information between the regulator and the regulated firm.  Adverse 
selection may result as the regulator cannot perfectly determine whether the regulated 
firm’s cost forecasts reflect best practice.  For example, some cost drivers may only 
be observed by the regulated firm, and not by external consultants that are often hired 
by the regulator to scrutinize the firm’s cost proposals. In a similar vein, the regulator 
may not be able to observe the opportunities that the firm has for cost reduction, 
which can lead to moral hazard. For example, the regulator may not be able to 
observe managerial effort.  
 
Overcoming asymmetric information and setting prices that allow regulated business 
to recover efficient costs requires the establishment of a regulatory framework 
including regulatory institutions (Chester, 2007). Indeed, the experience with 
economic regulation that followed the privatization and deregulation process of the 
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1990s highlighted the role of institutions in determining the effectiveness of 
electricity regulation (Bergera et al. 1998). 
 
The important role that institutions play in economics is well understood. North 
(1991) and Acemoglu (2006) point out that institutions are humanly devised 
constraints that structure interaction at the political, economic and social levels; 
provide incentive structure of an economy; create order and reduce uncertainty in 
economic exchange. From an institutional economics perspective, regulatory 
institutions consist of the institutional environment and the institutional arrangement 
as the two essential components (Williamson, 1996). The institutional environment 
consists of the 'rules of the game’, which can be formal or informal while the 
institutional arrangement focuses on the governance mechanism. Regulatory reform, 
in institutional terms, involves changing the rules of the game (i.e. the institutional 
environment) and modifying the governance mechanism or institutional arrangement 
in accordance with the new rules. The impact of new rules on economic performance 
runs through its long-lasting impact on institutions (Easterly and Levine, 2003).   
 
The institutional endowment of a country largely determines the institutional 
environment and the electricity sector regulatory effectiveness of countries tend to 
reflect many of the characteristics of institutions at a macro-level (Haney and Pollitt, 
2011). The institutional endowment of a country includes the five elements of 
legislative and executive system, judicial system, administrative system, informal 
rules and country-specific social and ideological characteristics (Levy and Spiller, 
1994). This implies that institutional endowment influences the economic 
performance of regulated network industries through its impact on institutional 
development in line with the arguments by Sokoloff and Engerman (2000).  
 
A number of empirical studies demonstrate that the extent to which a regulatory 
system becomes effective mostly depends on the country’s institutional environment. 
Henisz (2002) using discrete time logit models based on a two-century long historical 
analysis show that the level of stability of institutional environment is an important 
determinant of infrastructure investment in network industries. The sample size 
consisted for 160 countries with heterogeneous characteristics captured in the model 
such as colonization, regional belonging and a vector of time dummies. Haney and 
Pollitt (2011) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models showed that the existence 
and experience of an independent regulator is the most important institutional 
determinant in best practice electricity regulation. The authors constructed an 
empirical model to investigate the impacts of industry size, political and economic 
institutions on the degree of best practice regulation drawing from the incentive 
regulation and institutional economics literature. The best practice index was 
constructed from the survey responses of regulators in 40 countries. Similarly, 
Erdogdu (2013) showed the importance of better institutions in explaining why some 
countries can implement more extensive electricity and regulatory reforms using an 
econometric model based on Poisson regression with cross-section data. The data 
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covered 51 states in the US, 13 provinces in Canada and 51 other countries. The 
results showed the backgrounds of the chairperson and the minister/governor, the 
level of democracy and the level of country level corruption are significantly 
correlated with the extent of reform progress. In addition, Green and Rodriguez 
Pardina (1999) identified a set of standards involving the certainty, clarity and 
transparency of regulatory processes for effective electricity regulation based on an 
independent regulator model. Case studies and examples from countries around the 
globe are used to construct a regulatory manual with a view to provide information 
required for effective regulation early in the process. 
 
The theoretical literature on regulatory institutions, however, by and large has focused 
on the governance of regulatory contracts between the regulated firm and consumers 
(Goldberg, 1976; Williamson, 1996) and between the regulated firms and the 
government (Levy and Spiller, 1994). The characterization of the regulatory 
institutional organization, which is the decision-making mechanism for formulating 
and enforcing the rules, remain neglected by the literature (Brousseau and Fares, 
2000; Niesten, 2006). This paper adds to the understanding of how institutions 
interact with regulatory outcomes by studying the regulatory institutional organization 
in the electricity markets of Australia and comparing it to that of Norway. 
 
 
3. Methodology: A Cross-Country Institutional Approach 
 
The regulatory institutional organization includes the specification of authorities 
involved in the regulation of electricity industries (i.e. the different layers of 
institutions); the allocation of regulatory responsibilities among these authorities (i.e. 
their different roles) and the coordination mechanisms that underpin the mutual 
relations among these authorities. Earlier studies by Glachant and Finon (2000), Ogus 
(2002) and Niesten (2006) have clearly recognized the importance of specifying the 
rule makers, and the allocation of different regulatory tasks and powers among 
different regulatory authorities in the European electricity liberalization context.  
 
 
3.1. The Australian ESI 
 
Responsibility for electricity regulation in Australia was originally divided amongst 
state, territory and national regulators since the introduction of deregulation.  As part 
of the deregulation process a National Electricity Market (NEM) was developed.  This 
market comprises Queensland, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory, 
Victoria and South Australia. Tasmania joined the NEM when the Basslink 
Interconnector was commissioned in April 2006.  Jurisdictions in the NEM were 
required to regulate the electricity industry according to an industry access code. 
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The regulatory framework was changed in the early 2000s with a move to create 
national, rather than state based regulators. In the new regime, there are three main 
authorities involved in the economic regulation of electricity networks in Australia, 
namely the Standing Council of Energy and Resources (SCER), the Australian 
Energy Market Commission (AEMC) and the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). 
The responsibility of the wholesale market (NEM) operation lies with the Australian 
Energy Market Operator (AEMO). The AEMO was established in 2009 when a 
number of state planning bodies and gas market operators were combined with the 
National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO). AEMO is also 
responsible for transmission system planning in Victoria as planning functions have 
been separated from network ownership and operation which are left to the privately 
owned parties. These bodies constitute the regulatory and market framework 
governing the operation of the NEM. The roles and structures of the regulatory 
institutions are briefly described below: 
 
3.1.1. Standing Council of Energy and Resources (SCER) 
 
The SCER was established in 2011 by amalgamating the Ministerial Council on 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources and the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE). The 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) as the national policy and governing 
body of NEM established the MCE in 2001. The objective of the MCE was to deliver 
the economic and environmental benefits resulting from implementation of the 
COAG energy policy framework by providing national oversight, leadership and 
coordination of policies facing the Australian energy sector.   
 
SCER is responsible for pursuing a strategic national agenda across the Australian 
energy and resource sectors. One of SCER’s priority issues is to assess the market 
mechanisms and regulatory frameworks including governance of network regulation 
to facilitate adequate, efficient, and timely investment in networks and ensure 
efficient network operation. The ministers responsible for energy and resource matters 
in Commonwealth, State, Territory and New Zealand gain membership of SCER and 
are chaired by the Commonwealth Minster for Energy, Resources and Tourism. The 
decision making process within SCER is based on consensus wherever possible 
unless specific voting rules are included. In case of voting, the principle of one vote 
per jurisdiction applies (SCER, 2014). 
 
3.1.2. Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) 
 
The AEMC was established in 2005 under the Australian Energy Market Commission 
Establishment Act 2004 of South Australia when NEM jurisdictions agreed to change 
the NEM institutional arrangements. AEMC replaced the dissolved National 
Electricity Code Administrator (NECA), which was one of the governing bodies of 
the NEM and responsible for administering changes, and enforcing the National 
Electricity Code. AEMC was given the responsibility for making changes to the Rules 
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without the approval of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) and for conducting broader reviews as requested by the MCE (Moran and 
Sood, 2013). 
 
AEMC is responsible for maintaining and developing the National Electricity Rules 
(NER) and providing advice to Ministers on how best to develop energy markets over 
time (AEMC, 2013). It is the rule maker and developer of the national electricity and 
gas markets. The AEMC operates with three strategic policy areas with the retail, 
distribution and network regulation group being one of them. The group is responsible 
for reviews and rule change proposals relating to the retail markets and the regulation 
of revenues or the pricing of network companies (both distribution and transmission). 
AEMC consists of three commissioners where two of these are appointed on the 
recommendation of the participating State and Territory jurisdictions while one is 
appointed on the recommendation of the Commonwealth Government. One of the 
commissioners acts as the chairman of AEMC. 
 
3.1.3. Australian Energy Regulator (AER) 
 
The AER was established in 2005 as an independent statutory authority and 
administratively part of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) under Part IIIAA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA).  AER was set up as 
a division within the ACCC to monitor as well as to perform the ACCC’s 
transmission revenue regulatory functions. AER was created in an attempt to mitigate 
the confusing and overlapping style of decision-making process practiced by NECA 
and ACCC, which led to the institutional reform of 2005 (Moran and Sood, 2013). 
The AER operates under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.  
AER is responsible for monitoring, investigating and enforcing compliance in the 
wholesale electricity and gas markets; regulating electricity networks and natural gas 
pipelines by setting the maximum amount of prices that the network companies can 
charge; and the regulation of the retail electricity and gas markets where jurisdictions 
have commenced the National Energy Retail Law. However, maximum retail tariffs 
for small customers remain in the hands of the jurisdictional regulation in other states 
except Victoria and South Australia. The Commonwealth funds the AER, while the 
staff, resources and facilities are provided through the ACCC. The AER Board is an 
independent entity and consists of 3 members appointed by the Governor-General for 
terms of up to five years, and one of them chairs the AER. The three-member board 
consists of one Commonwealth member and two state/territory members. The AER 
may make decisions in relation to its functions under the National Electricity Law, 
National Gas Law and National Retail Law. However, decisions of the AER are 
subject to judicial review by the Federal Court of Australia. 
AER regulates the maximum amount of revenue that the network companies can 
allowed to earn as the network companies submit proposal to the AER on the prices 
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or revenue that they want the AER to set. The AER reviews the proposals submitted 
by the network companies and makes decisions considering several factors such as 
increasing electricity demand, assets profile, operating costs and network reliability 
where the regulatory control period generally apply for five years. All expenditures on 
electricity networks are included in the regulatory asset base (RAB) when 
determining the capital expenditure allowances, operating expenditure allowances and 
the cost of capital. The network companies can earn a high-regulated rate of return of 
10.2%, which can encourage gold-plating behaviour among network companies.    
 The AER applies the weighted average price caps and maximum revenue caps such 
as the ‘CPI-X’ pricing regime (or price cap regulation) to set the price/revenue path of 
the regulated network companies that incorporates inflation adjustment and a required 
productivity increase. CPI is the Consumer Price Index and is a measure of inflation 
while the ‘X’ factor is some measure of expected improvements in efficiency. In 
theory, the delinking of prices/revenues with the underlying costs of the firm imply 
that the ‘CPI-X’ regime is an incentive based regime that provides strong incentives 
for cost or efficiency savings after the price path has been set in relation to the 
forecasted costs for a given regulatory control period (Littlechild, 1983; Joskow, 
2013). However, a less desirable feature of the traditional ‘CPI-X’ regulation is that 
the incentive for efficiency savings diminishes as the regulatory period proceeds. The 
AER uses a building block model that accounts for a network’s operating and 
maintenance (O&M) expenditure, capital expenditure, asset depreciation costs and 
taxation liabilities, and for a return on capital (AER, 2013). However, an efficiency 
carryover mechanism in the building block approach to incentive regulation prevents 
the incentives to defer cost savings in the 'CPI-X' regulatory framework. The price 
control mechanisms in the distribution network regulation by the AER can involve the 
weighted average price caps or average/maximum revenue caps.   
3.2. The Norwegian ESI 
Norway was one of the first countries to deregulate and liberalise its ESI following 
the enactment of the new Energy Act in 1990, which provided the legal foundation for 
Norway’s electricity market reform. The creation of a spot market for wholesale 
electricity trade; the legal vertical separation of the dominant, state-owned, and 
vertically integrated company Statkraft into Statkraft SF (a generating company) and 
Statnett SF (a transmission company); and the network regulation of the monopoly 
segments of the ESI were significant elements of the reform process (Bye and Hope, 
2005).  
Norway, participates in the competitive Nord Pool Spot for wholesale electricity 
trade, which is the largest joint wholesale market for electricity trade in the world in 
terms of volumes (TWh) traded. The Nord Pool Spot is licensed by the Norwegian 
Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) responsible for organizing and 
operating a market place for power trading, and by the Norwegian Ministry of 
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Petroleum and Energy (MPE) to facilitate the international integration of power 
markets. Norway implemented the market liberalisation process without changes in 
the ownership (i.e. privatisation) unlike the UK where privatisation was considered a 
prerequisite for successful electricity market reform from an economic efficiency 
perspective (Midttun and Thomas, 1998). The main regulatory institutions responsible 
for the regulation of Norwegian ESI include the MPE, the Norwegian Competition 
Authority (NCA) and the NVE. 
3.2.1. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) 
The Norwegian MPE was established in 1997 and is under the lead of the Minister of 
Petroleum and Energy. The Minister has personal staffs with one state secretary and 
one political advisor. The ministry has around 140 employees. The principal 
responsibility of the MPE is to achieve a coordinated and integrated energy policy. 
The Ministry has four departments including the Energy and Water resources 
department. The Department aims to ensure good management of water and 
hydropower resources, other domestic energy sources and energy use in both 
economic and environmental terms. The department has a section for electricity 
market whose role also includes overseeing of issues related to the regulation of grid 
activities and setting electricity grid tariffs. The department is also responsible for 
monitoring the state-owned enterprises Statnett SF and Enova SF. 
3.2.2. Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) 
Competition regulation in Norway started in 1917 after the breakout of World War I. 
However, the present name came in 1994 when a new Competition Act was passed 
and the authority was restructured. The Ministry of Government Administration, 
Reform and Church Affairs provides framework for the NCA’s activities and acts as 
the appellate body of the NCA’s decisions. The Department of Competition Policy 
within the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs is 
responsible for drafting the Competition Act and for managing the NCA. The NCA 
employs in excess of 100 employees. 
The main role of the NCA as a government agency is to enforce the competition law 
in accordance to the Norwegian Competition Act of 2004. The NCA investigates 
mergers and acquisitions. In the electricity sector, the Norwegian competition policy 
has mainly been concerned with improving market transparency through the retail-
price information system and elimination of any market power abuse by dominant 
firms that have resulted from mergers and acquisitions. A price information system 
for retail prices from power suppliers was introduced by the NCA in 1998 to improve 
market transparency. The time allowed for consumer switching was also reduced to a 
week. The price information system has largely improved the market transparency in 
the retail segment. The introduction of the retail price information system along with 
other regulatory measures such as the abolishment of switching fees have stimulated 
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retail market competition in Norway (Bye and Hope, 2005). The NCA is also 
responsible for assessing the implications of transmission capacity constraints on 
competition in the electricity markets.  
3.2.3. Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) 
The NVE is a Norwegian Government Agency established in 1921. The NVE was 
assigned the role of electricity regulator with the enforcement of the Norwegian 
Energy Act in 1991. The regulatory tasks are ensured by the NVE while a regulatory 
body was set up as one of the departments within NVE in 1990. The regulatory staff 
comprises approximately 100 employees, with competences in economics, 
engineering and other academic professions and covers the responsibilities of energy 
modeling and analysis, economic regulation of network companies, regulation of 
system responsibility, network operation and planning, network pricing, wholesale 
and retail market regulation and monitoring, energy efficiency, energy resources, 
energy security and emergency preparedness (NVE, 2011a).  
NVE acts as the national independent regulatory authority for the electricity market in 
Norway while the Director General performs the functions of the regulator. The 
regulator has no ownership interests in the electricity industry and is an independent 
legal entity with its own budget adopted by Parliament and has the power to act in the 
scope of its competences (NVE, 2011a). The budget covering the regulatory functions 
is mainly provided through the yearly government budget and by fees paid by the 
regulated companies. 
NVE is delegated powers through the Energy Act and has the powers to issue 
regulations on economic and technical reporting, network income, market access and 
network tariffs, non-discriminatory behavior, customer information, metering, 
settlement and billing and the organized physical power exchange (Nord Pool Spot) 
(NVE, 2011a). NVE has the discretion to take necessary decisions to fulfill the 
delegated powers according to the Energy Act as well as issuing regulations on 
system responsibility and quality of supply. The NVE's energy and regulation 
department regulates and monitors the Norwegian power networks. 
The economic regulation of electricity networks in Norway involves a combination of 
'direct' and 'economic' instruments. The direct instruments, as reflected in the 
Norwegian Energy Act, oblige the companies to connect to new consumers and 
generation sources and provide high level of power quality. The network companies 
may charge an investment contribution to cover the costs of new network 
connections. Network companies also receive a reasonable return, a minimum of 2%, 
on their investments given effective management and utilization of the networks 
while any companies falling short of the minimum return will receive compensation 
at the end of regulatory period.  
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Rate-of-return regulation was used to set the monopoly prices in the Norwegian ESI 
before 1997 and later changed to income-frame regulations (Forsund and Kittelsen, 
1998). However, the current economic instruments involve the use of 'revenue caps' 
as an incentive-based regime to determine annual revenue caps for each individual 
licensee. The allowed revenue is intended to cover the costs of operation and 
depreciation of the grid with a reasonable rate of return on invested capital over the 
regulatory period. The revenue cap formula to determine the income of the 155 
companies in Norway is based on the formula 'RCt=0.4Ct+0.6t' where RCt is the 
revenue cap in year t and Ct is the cost base for each network company based on costs 
from year t-2. Ct* is the cost norm for the company derived from a total cost 
benchmarking analysis of the companies and also based on data from year t-2. The 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to benchmark the costs of network 
companies and OLS regression models are used to correct the DEA results for 
environmental factors. NVE also defines a WACC (weighted average cost of capital) 
to calculate the capital cost of each company (NVE, 2011b). Thus, the Norwegian 
incentive regulation regime has both the elements of cost efficiency incentive and 
yardstick regulation. 
Table 1 summarises the regulatory framework and organisation structure of the 
regulatory institutions in Australia and Norway. The table highlights the general 
institutional approach to ESI regulation in these two countries along with the 
individual characteristics of the independent regulatory agency (IRA). However, it 
needs to be understood that any direct comparison between the regulatory institutional 
organisation between Norway and Australia should account for the differences in the 
geography, regulatory environment and industry structure between these two 
countries.  
 
Properties\Countries Australia Norway 
General approach (main institutions) Ministry and IRA Ministry and IRA 
Observations both at federal and at 
individual states  
national level 
Scope of IRA electricity and gas electricity and district 
heating 
Board Members of IRA 3 no board but a 
director general 
Length of appointment of IRA up to 5 years n/a 
Possibility of renewal of IRA Yes n/a 
Staff of IRA 126 monitoring over 
around 20 million 
population 
100 monitoring over 
around 5 million 
population 
Budget of IRA 6200000 AUSD
2
 920 million NOK
3
 
                                                        
2 Based on the expenditures assessment of AER on major items such as payments to external 
consultants, lawyers, travel, employee costs and website management as documented in the AER 
inaugural report (see AER, 2012). 
3 The budget reported for 2013 in Norwegian Kroner (NOK). Einar Hope provided the 
information. 
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Main source of financing of IRA government and 
financed through 
ACCC 
parliament and fees 
from regulated 
companies 
Pricing regime revenue cap revenue cap 
Regulated rate-of return 10.2% 2% (minimum) 
Use of benchmarking no explicit use yes 
Table 1: Regulatory institutional comparisons 
 
Figure 1 below shows the end user network costs for domestic consumers under 
varying consumption range among the European countries such as the UK and 
Norway. Both UK and Norway are considered to be leaders in global electricity sector 
liberalisation (Pollitt, 2007). It can be seen that the networks costs in both UK and 
Norway has been relatively stable across each consumption range
4
.  The network 
costs in Norway are much lower than in the UK for high consumption domestic users.  
   
 
                                        2 500 kWh < Consumption < 5 000 kWh 
 
 
5000 kWh < Consumption < 15 000 kWh 
 
                                                        
4 A detailed discussion on the evolution of distribution network costs in the UK is contained in 
Mountain and Littlechild (2010). 
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Consumption > 15 000 kWh 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of network costs in euros/kwh
5
 (purchasing power parity 
adjusted 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Likewise, Table 2 shows that rising network costs have been the largest contributor to 
price increase since 2010 in the NEM. Network costs, on average, accounted for 
around 50% of price increases in states like Queensland, New South Wales and 
Tasmania during 2011/12 where the state owns the transmission and distribution 
assets. In Victoria and South Australia, network share of total residential electricity 
costs consisted of 34% and 46% respectively. 
 
 Network costs( in  
cents/kwh) 
Network share 
of total 
residential 
electricity 
costs 
Contribution to price increases 
from 2011-12 to 2014-15 (in %) 
 2011-
12 
2014-
15 
Increase 2011-
12 
2014-
15 
Distribution Transmission 
Queensland 11.0 14.6 32.7% 49.8% 52.3% 58.6 3.4 
New South 
Wales 
14.1 16.0 13.5% 55.5% 51.6% 0 33.9 
Victoria 9.8 13.2 34.7% 34% 37.5% 51.6 1.6 
South 
Australia 
13.8 18.2 31.9% 46.2% 54.7% 108.8 20.6 
Tasmania 14.2 17.5 23.2% 54.2% 56.3% 40.8 26.5 
Table 2: Projected network costs 2011/12 to 2014/15 
                                                        
5 Please note that the consistent data on the UK network costs in missing in Eurostat and hence is 
not reported in the figures for 2007 and 2012. 
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
United
Kingdom
Norway
15 
 
Source: AEMC (2013) 
 
 
4. Results and Discussions: Policy Issues and Recommendations 
 
This section draws upon the analysis of the regulatory framework and regulatory 
institutional organisation in Norway and Australia. Such comparison allows us to 
focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the regulatory arrangements between these 
countries. However, there are difficulties in making direct comparisons between the 
regulatory framework and the way in which particular regulatory bodies implement 
that framework (Mountain and Littlechild, 2010). We identified five key differences, 
in particular, which are discussed below.  
 
4.1. Independence of the AER 
 
There are several criteria to gauge the independence of a regulator. It is claimed that 
independent regulatory agencies are better able to hire more experienced and capable 
personnel because they are not restricted to civil servant salaries (Cushman, 1941). 
Independent agencies also have a long-term focus (Landis, 1938). Stern (1997) and 
Stern and Holder (1999) define regulatory independence in terms of the distance 
between the government and the regulatory bodies measured against factors such as 
the appointment and dismissal of the regulatory bodies; financing of the regulatory 
bodies and the relationship between the regulatory body and the government (such as 
separate office independent of any ministries, a body independent of government, 
etc.).  The appointment and dismissal procedures (or the security of the tenure 
members); source of finance and the relationship of the regulatory body with the 
government are crucial in governing the regulatory framework aspects such as the 
level of discretion and the burden of proof of the regulator (see also Mountain and 
Littlechild, 2010). 
 
The AER is financed by ACCC and does not have its own budget and staffing 
arrangements. Hence, it may be influenced by ACCC given the close links between 
these bodies. It is also only responsible for implementing the rules recommended by 
the AEMC and approved by SCER. The SCER represents the council of government 
ministers, and therefore has financial interests in limiting the power of the AER 
because of ownership interests in the network companies in Queensland, Tasmania 
and New South Wales. The AER has no power to control or manage retail prices, that 
power being in the hands of the state bodies, the Queensland Competition Authority 
(QCA), New South Wales’ Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) 
and the Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator (OTTER). 
 
By comparison, the NVE in Norway is jointly funded by the parliament and the fees 
paid by the regulated companies. It is empowered with designing and implementing 
rules such as regulation on economic and technical reporting, network income, market 
access and network tariffs. The NVE has the power to develop enhanced efficiency 
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incentives through price control. By contrast, the AER has limited power to develop 
efficiency incentives by using retail tariff as a mechanism. In that sense, the NVE has 
more scope for defining incentives than the AER. 
 
Similarly, in Norway, the assumptions about future parameters such as the level of 
demand, operating expenditures, capital expenditures, and cost of capital is entirely a 
matter for the regulator as in the UK (OFGEM, 2009). NVE exercises a greater 
degree of control over the information that network companies provide. Hence, the 
burden of proof is on the regulated network companies to convince the regulator to 
adopt the conditions in their own proposal. However, in Australia, the AER is 
required to accept cost proposals by a distribution company if the proposed costs are 
efficient and reasonable. Hence, the burden of proof is on the AER if it chooses 
different parameters to those proposed by the network company, as this will need 
justification as required by the NEL. This burden of proof can be minimized if AER is 
granted more authority, which will involve changing the rules in NEL. 
 
In the short term, the processes and effectiveness of the AER as an independent 
agency can be improved by eliminating resourcing constraints in terms of providing 
adequate budget and staffing and providing the AER with greater responsibility with 
respect to determining appropriate levels of demand, investment and tariff setting, 
thus making one body more accountable for the economic and technical performance 
of the ESI.  
 
In the long run, the AER can be separated from the ACCC and established as a 
separate entity with its own budget and staffing. This would improve the transparency 
of the AER and it is consistent with the changing operating environment of the 
Australian ESI where the regulatory tasks are likely to increase in the transition 
towards a low-carbon economy and the transformation of the electricity grids to be 
able to respond to new technologies and demand conditions. 
 
4.2. Coordination between AER and different federal and state regulatory 
institutions 
 
Coordination mechanisms between the different regulatory institutions are desirable 
to avoid any overlap of regulatory responsibilities between the authorities involved. 
Coordination is also required to resolve inconsistencies in the interpretation of terms 
among the regulatory institutions (Niesten, 2006). A common mechanism to 
coordinate the relationship between various regulatory organizations is by complying 
with a memorandum of understanding or agreement or association. The AER has a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the AEMC and the ACCC with a view to 
streamline and co-ordinate the governance arrangements for Australian energy 
markets. The MoU recognizes the importance of communication, cooperation and 
reciprocity between the regulatory institutions. However, state and territory 
governments, and their regulators still play too large a role in regulating retail 
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arrangements and also mandate other license conditions for network companies 
(Productivity Commission, 2013).  
 
In Norway, there is a cooperation agreement between NVE, the Competition 
Authority (such as mergers issues) and the Financial Supervisory Authority of 
Norway (financial markets). Most importantly, the coordination among different 
regulatory institutions is achieved by decision-making procedures based on the 
principles of subsidiarity (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). Subsidiarity is an organising 
principle of decentralization based on the idea that a matter ought to be handled by the 
smallest, lowest, or least centralized authority capable of addressing that matter 
effectively (Kersbergen and Verbeek, 2004). Hence, central authority only should 
have a subsidiary function and performing only those tasks, which cannot be 
performed effectively at a more immediate or local level. This implies that the 
subsidiarity principle also delegates power to different regulatory institutions along 
with streamlining the coordination among different regulatory institutions. The AER 
can also benefit from enhanced coordination exercising the subsidiarity principles 
guided by economic logics more in practice than in theory. Delegation of 
responsibilities and accountability under the subsidiarity principles can avoid any 
potential conflict of objectives between the AER and the state regulators. 
 
4.3. Application of robust benchmarking techniques 
 
Benchmarking can be broadly defined as comparison of some measure of actual 
performance against a reference or benchmark performance (Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2000). The primary role of benchmarking under incentive regulation is to decouple 
the allowed revenues of a network company from its own underlying costs by 
determining the regulated revenue cap based on the cost structures of other regulated 
similar network companies. Benchmarking conceptually mimics the incentives 
offered by a competitive market in a monopoly environment. This resembles a 
yardstick competition in its extreme form where the outcomes of perfect competition 
are replicated in a monopoly market (Shleifer, 1985). 
Norway was one of the first European countries to introduce an incentive regulation 
regime based on efficiency benchmarking. Norway switched to an incentive 
regulation based on the DEA technique in 1997 (Forsund and Kittlesen, 1998). The 
cost norm Ct* of each network operator is obtained from the DEA analysis under the 
current regulatory framework. Norway is also the only country where the regulator 
has systematically examined the effects of environmental factors on the quality of 
service and reflected these in the efficiency benchmarking models (Bjorndal et al. 
2009; WIK, 2011).  The existing efficiency benchmarking utilizes measures of snow, 
forest, and coastal climate as output variables in the DEA model. Hence, the model 
assumes that these affect the network companies’ production function rather than their 
efficiency. Also, the benchmarking process gets enhanced through learning-by-doing. 
However, undertaking regulatory benchmarking and the learning-by-doing to enhance 
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the process requires significant financial and human resources, which the AER seem 
to lack. For example, the UK regulator, Ofgem, retained an academic advisor to assist 
in the development of benchmarking analysis with strong interaction between the 
industry and consumers in the development of incentives (OFGEM, 2009). The 
benchmarking technique has also changed from relatively simple comparisons to use 
of corrected OLS. 
However, in Australia, the regulatory interest in benchmarking is limited even though 
a London Economics benchmarking study for IPART concluded that the NSW 
distribution companies were inefficient compared to the 200 other companies in the 
dataset (IPART, 1999; Haney and Pollitt, 2009). The application of benchmarking in 
the past also received criticism from the regulated network companies. The absence of 
systematic benchmarking implies that the AER relies on ‘bottom-up’ reviews of 
distribution companies’ expenditure proposals where price controls are generally 
undertaken sequentially for network companies in different States (Mountian and 
Littlechild, 2010). However, the AEMC established new directives regarding the use 
of benchmarking in 2013. The use of benchmarking analysis by the AER as a 
powerful incentive mechanism tool may improve the cost efficiency of the 
distribution network companies and avoid gold plating (Averch and Johnson, 1962) in 
electricity distribution while also eliminating the existing practice of distribution 
companies formulating their proposals with minimal guidance.  
However, benchmarking analysis involves identifying the relevant costs approach 
such as top-down or bottom-up, the cost drivers, the data sample and the appropriate 
benchmarking technique. International benchmarking is an option to increase the 
sample size, as the AER currently regulates 13 electricity distribution companies in 
Australia with differing network characteristics and assets profile. However, cross-
country differences among companies need to be accounted for and benchmarking 
becomes complicated. As such, the costs of not doing robust benchmarking are high 
and the AER may currently adopt benchmarking for informative results rather than 
obtaining deterministic results. As the AER gets wiser, and more capable and 
resourceful in the long run, benchmarking using robust benchmarking techniques can 
be explicitly applied to set the incentives for network companies in the incentive 
regulation regime, which is a work in progress at the moment.  
4.4. Demand-side involvement 
An independent regulator is the guardian of the public interest (Armstrong, Cowan 
and Vickers, 1994). An effective regulatory framework adequately involves consumer 
priorities and interests in the economic regulation of networks. This is important 
because future electricity networks need to move from a passive to an active 
operation, and network and tariff design need to provide opportunity for end-users to 
participate as actors in the market by actively responding to real-time price signals 
(Joskow, 2012). The advent of smart grids and mobile electricity consumers 
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(electromobility) has also signalled the demise of the long held assumption on the 
technological maturity of the electricity networks (Schiavo et al., 2013). Likewise, 
distributed generation is blurring the traditional delineation between consumers and 
producers and thereby increasing the number of prosumers as new market participants 
in the ESI. Thus, it is important that electricity markets serve constantly evolving 
consumer needs through appropriate regulatory arrangements. 
To date, the AER has neither engaged well with consumer groups nor has created the 
environment for network companies to engage with consumers  (Productivity 
Commission, 2013). One of the ways in which consumers can participate in the 
energy markets is by being able to switch suppliers. However, the retail market lacks 
adequate transparency-leaving consumers with opaque price information. This implies 
that the efforts to educate consumers about their choices can be improved. For 
example, the AER commissioned the Energy Made Easy website which seeks to 
provide comparative retail offers from 36 authorised retailers. However, the ‘standing 
offers’ detailed on the website are outside the bilateral negotiation which happens 
between the customer and the retailer before deciding on the final contractual terms. 
This means that ‘standing offers’ could overstate price, offering discounts to those 
that are able to negotiate beneficial terms, rather than provide equitable pricing 
structures. Also, in Queensland, consumers are still supplied by their retailer at the 
regulated prices determined by the Queensland Competition Authority (QCA, 2013), 
so the website does not provide comparative ‘standing offers’ for all customers, 
rendering the information patchy at best.    In addition, Consumer involvement in the 
regulated network segments can be empowered through new ownership models. For 
example, in Norway, the council and local municipalities also own the regulated 
distribution network companies.  
The establishment of new institutions such the National Energy Consumer Advocacy 
Body and the Consumer Challenge Panel on 1 July, 2013 are desirable moves to 
formalise the involvement of consumers in the regulatory process. However, the 
effectiveness of these bodies can only be guaranteed if these bodies are independent 
from the AER, are accorded some power or authority in the network regulated 
revenue determination process, and receive adequate funding and staffing resources. 
Demand-side involvement is also likely to intensify with the large-scale adoption of 
smart meters and smart grid where consumers have the opportunity to respond to real-
time price signals. These technical changes further necessitate that future network 
regulation should involve adequate communication with the stakeholders while being 
flexible and effective. 
4.5. Privatisation as an option 
Economic theory suggests that privatisation may improve resource allocation (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1998). Practical examples of electricity privatisation success includes the 
UK where consumers benefited from high service reliability and lower power prices 
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since privatisation in 1990 as real prices fell by about 25 precent (Thomas, 2002). 
Network costs in the UK have also remained stable and have not increased in real 
terms (OFGEM, 2009). In Australia, electricity prices have decreased for the first 10 
years of the reform but have increased over the last few years (Chester and Morris, 
2011). 
The transmission and distribution networks in Tasmania, New South Wales, 
Queensland and partly of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) remain state-owned. 
State-owned network companies can have conflicting and differing objectives that can 
undermine the effectiveness of incentive regulation as well as reduce economic 
efficiency. The Productivity Commission (2013) has identified significant gaps in the 
performance of state-owned corporations and privately owned network companies in 
the Australian ESI (Productivity Commission, 2013). Privatisation, as a public policy 
instrument, remains an option to improve the efficiency of network companies by 
reducing distortions and improving incentives. This is importantly so as private 
companies can be expected to be more aggressive in dealing with the regulators 
although the evidence is little in Australia (Breunig and Menezes, 2012). However, 
the success of privatisation is not guaranteed and should not be considered at its face 
value. Newbery (2004) argues that successful privatisation of network companies 
requires incentive-based regulation that allows investment to be adequately rewarded 
from unsubsidised revenues while maintaining quality, but restrictions that permit 
effective competition for the network services.  
Norway pursued the market liberalisation reforms without changes in ownership as 
privatisation of the power sector was politically unacceptable (Bye and Hope, 2005). 
However, consumers have been able to actively participate in the market and seem to 
get a fair price deal as competition among 97 state-owned and independent retailers is 
strong and prices are close to costs (Von der Fehr and Hansen, 2010). This can largely 
be attributed to incentive-based regulation that provides strong incentives for cost 
efficiency and discourages gold plating alongside the surrounding regulatory 
institutions and arrangement. Hence, the success of privatisation is strongly linked to 
the regulatory regime and institutions while state ownership does not preclude the 
need to have adequate regulatory arrangements and sound regulatory practice in 
liberalizing electricity industries. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper studies the regulatory institutional organisation of electricity networks 
regulation in the Australian NEM and identifies some inadequacies in the existing 
regulatory arrangements and framework. We find that the national regulatory regime 
and arrangements can provide potential for gold plated network costs and rising end-
user electricity prices in Australia in the absence of incentives for undertaking 
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efficient investment. We also study the regulatory institutional organisation and 
arrangements in Norway as a successful liberalised electricity market model with 
effective competition and regulation without privatisation of the ESI. This allowed us 
to diagnose the weaknesses in the regulation of the Australian ESI even though it was 
not the aim of the paper to make a direct comparison between these two markets 
given inherent country-specific differences.           
This paper identifies several short-run and long run regulatory and institutional reform 
measures that could be adopted to strengthen the position of the AER and streamline 
the network regulatory process. In the short-term, the AER should be provided with 
adequate resources (financial and staff experts) and discretion while making it 
accountable for the resource use and decision-making. The Norwegian regulatory 
model provides a good example of creating balance between the advantages of an 
independent regulator against the disadvantages of complete regulatory independence. 
Unnecessary bureaucratic time delays at the SCER and AEMC level should be 
minimised so that the reform processes are timely and quick (Productivity 
Commission, 2013). SCER seem to exercise undue power over the regulation of its 
own profit-making entities. The abolishment of SCER would imply that SER and 
AEMC should directly report to the Federal minister responsible for energy and 
reduce the unnecessary decision making delays.  The regulatory arrangements and 
pricing regime should focus more on customer engagement and delivering the 
customer needs. 
In the long run, the AER should be separated from the ACCC, as a separate entity 
while robust benchmarking techniques should be adopted in the incentive regulation 
framework to provide powerful incentives for cost efficiency. This will also 
necessitate incorporating other output-based variables such as quality in the incentive 
regulation framework so that the cost-efficiency incentives do not conflict with 
service quality objectives. The privatisation of the state-owned assets also remains an 
option. However, privatisation should not occur until sound regulatory arrangements 
are in place. Whether sound regulatory arrangements involve eliminating all existing 
state based electricity regulators and instead operate only with a national regulator? 
This remains an important question for the future. Further research can also focus on 
the appropriate pricing regime for future network regulation that should facilitate the 
transition to a low-carbon economy, which involves electricity networks undergoing 
profound technical changes.  
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